In this paper we define cut-free hypersequent calculi for some intermediate logics semantically characterized by bounded Kripke models. In particular we consider the logics characterized by Kripke models of bounded width Bw k , by Kripke models of bounded cardinality Bc k and by linearly ordered Kripke models of bounded cardinality G k . The latter family of logics coincides with finite-valued Gödel logics. Our calculi turn out to be very simple and natural. Indeed, for each family of logics (respectively, Bw k , Bc k and G k ), they are defined by adding just one structural rule to a common system, namely the hypersequent calculus for Intuitionistic Logic. This structural rule reflects in a natural way the characteristic semantical features of the corresponding logic.
Introduction
Kripke models provide a suitable semantical characterization of propositional intermediate logics (see [8] ), that is, logics including the Intuitionistic one and included in Classical Logic.
In this paper we investigate the proof theory of some intermediate logics semantically characterized by bounded Kripke models. More precisely, for any k ≥ 1, we will consider the logics whose semantics are given by:
1. The class of finite trees not containing k + 1 pairwise incomparable nodes (for short, finite trees of width ≤ k);
2. The class of trees containing at most k nodes;
3. The class of trees of width ≤ 1 and with at most k nodes.
In the first case one gets the so called logics of bounded width Kripke models, Bw k . The second case yields the logics of bounded cardinality Kripke models, Bc k . Finally, in the third case we get the intermediate logics of linear orders with at most k-elements. These logics turn out to coincide with (k + 1)-valued Gödel logics G k . Hilbert style axiomatizations of Bw k and Bc k are respectively obtained extending the familiar axiomatization of Intuitionistic Logic by the axioms k i=0 (p i → j =i p j ) and p 0 ∨ (p 0 → p 1 ) ∨ . . . ∨ (p 0 ∧ . . . ∧ p k−1 → p k ). Adding to Bc k the linearity axiom (p → q) ∨ (q → p) one gets (k + 1)-valued Gödel logic.
The logics considered here have found applications in different areas of computer science. Indeed, Bw 1 coincides with infinite-valued Gödel logic, which is one of the most important formalizations of fuzzy logic (see [15] ). Bc 1 is Classical Logic. Bc 2 , also referred to as Sm [8] or logic of "here and there", has been used to analyse inference in extended logic programming (see [18] ).
In this paper we define cut-free calculi for all logics Bw k , Bc k and G k , with k ≥ 1. To the best of our knowledge no analytic calculi have been provided for the first two families of logics. Things are not so bad for G k . Indeed there exist general methods to build up analytic calculi for every finite-valued logic (see, e.g., [20, 19, 7, 14] ) or projective logic ( [6] ), and in particular for finite-valued Gödel logics. However, the resulting calculi are just a rewriting of the truth-tables of their associated connectives. Thus making the proof theory of any such logic a purely "ad hoc" construct. In particular these calculi hide all existing relationships between finite-valued Gödel logics and the other logics considered in this paper.
In this work we will provide cut-free hypersequent calculi for logics Bw k , Bc k and G k . Hypersequent calculi are a natural generalization of ordinary sequent calculi and turn out to be very suitable for expressing disjunctive axioms in an analytic way (see [5] for an overview). Indeed a common feature of the above mentioned logics is the fact that their properties can be expressed in a disjunctive form.
Our calculi follow a standard pattern: all calculi belonging to the same family (respectively, Bw k , Bc k and G k ) are uniform and are simply obtained by adding just one structural rule to the hypersequent calculus for Intuitionistic Logic. This structural rule reflects in a natural way the characteristic property of the corresponding logic.
Since hypersequent calculi are closely related to the goal-oriented proof procedures introduced in [13] , our calculi might help to define similar kinds of deduction methods for Bw k , Bc k and G k .
Preliminaries
To make the paper self contained we recall some basic notions.
Intermediate Logics and Kripke Models
The set of propositional well formed formulas (wff 's for short) is defined, as usual, starting from an enumerable set of propositional variables and using the logical constants ⊥, ∧, ∨, → . We denote with p and q, possibly with indexes, propositional variables and with A, B,. . . arbitrary wff's. Moreover, we use ¬A as an abbreviation for A → ⊥.
Int and Cl will denote respectively both an arbitrary calculus for propositional Intuitionistic and Classical Logic and the set of intuitionistically and classically valid wff's.
An intermediate propositional logic (see, e.g., [8] ) is any set L of wff's satisfying the following conditions: (i) L is consistent; (ii) Int ⊆ L; (iii) L is closed under modus ponens; (iv) L is closed under propositional substitution (where a propositional substitution is any function mapping every propositional variable to a wff). It is well known that, for any intermediate logic L, L ⊆ Cl.
If A is a set of axiom-schemes and L is an intermediate logic, the notation L + A will indicate both the deductive system closed under modus ponens and arbitrary substitutions obtained by adding to L the axiom-schemes of A, and the set of theorems of such a deductive system.
A (propositional) Kripke model is a structure K = P, ≤, −− , where P, ≤ is a poset (partially ordered set), and −− (the forcing relation) is a binary relation between elements of P and atomic wff's such that, for any propositional variable p, α −−p implies β −−p for every β ∈ P such that α ≤ β. The forcing relation is extended to arbitrary wff's as follows:
2. α −−B ∧ C iff α −−B and α −−C;
We write α − / −A to mean that α −−A does not hold. We remark that, according to the above interpretation, α −−¬A iff for every β ∈ P such that α ≤ β we have β − / −A. For a finite set of wff's Γ, we write α −−Γ to mean that α −−A holds for every A ∈ Γ. Finally, we say that a wff A is valid in a Kripke model
It is easy to check that the forcing relation meets the monotonicity condition, that is, for each wff A, Kripke model K = P, ≤, −− and element α in K, if α −−A then β −−A for every β ∈ P such that α ≤ β.
If F is a non empty class of posets, we call {K = P, ≤, −− | P, ≤ ∈ F} the class of Kripke models built on F. Let L(F) be the set of wff's valid in all the Kripke models built on F. It is well known that, for every non empty class F of posets, L(F) is an intermediate logic (see, e.g., [8, 12] ). We say that an intermediate logic L is characterized by the class of posets F if L = L(F).
Hypersequent Calculi
Hypersequent calculi are a simple and natural generalization of ordinary Gentzen calculi, see e.g. [5] for an overview. Definition 1 A hypersequent is an expression of the form
where, for all i = 1, . . . n, Γ i ∆ i is an ordinary sequent. Γ i ∆ i is called a component of the hypersequent. We say that a hypersequent is single-conclusion if, for any i = 1, . . . , n, ∆ i consists of at most one wff.
The intended meaning of the symbol | is disjunctive.
For the purposes of this paper it is convenient to treat sequents and hypersequents as multisets of wff's and multisets of sequents, respectively. Moreover we only deal with single-conclusion hypersequents.
Like in ordinary sequent calculi, in a hypersequent calculus there are initial hypersequents and rules. Typically, the former are identities, that is of the form A A, while the latter are divided into logical and structural rules. The logical ones are essentially the same as in sequent calculi, the only difference is the presence of dummy contexts, called side hypersequents. We will use the symbol G to denote a side hypersequent.
The structural rules are divided into internal and external rules. The internal rules deal with wff's within components. They are the same as in ordinary sequent calculi. The external rules manipulate whole components within a hypersequent. These are external weakening (EW) and external contraction (EC).
In Table 1 we present a hypersequent calculus for Int, we call it hInt. Clearly this calculus is redundant in the sense that, if
Internal Structural Rules In hypersequent calculi it is possible to define new kind of structural rules which simultaneously act on several components of one or more hypersequents. It is this type of rule which increases the expressive power of hypersequent calculi with respect to ordinary sequent calculi. Effective use of this kind of rules is given by the following examples, involving intermediate logics:
• A Hilbert-style axiomatization for LQ logic, also known as Jankov logic [16] , is obtained by extending the axioms of Int with ¬p ∨ ¬¬p. Semantically, LQ is characterized by the class of all finite and rooted posets with a single final element. A cut-free calculus for this logic is defined by adding the following rule to the hypersequent calculus for Int ( [10] )
• Gödel logic, also known as Dummett's LC logic [11] , is given by Int + {(p → q) ∨ (q → p)}. This logic can be seen both as an intermediate logic and as a many-valued logic. Indeed, on the one hand, it is characterized by the class of all rooted linearly ordered Kripke models. On the other hand, its connectives can be interpreted as functions over the real interval [0, 1] as follows:
By adding to hInt the following rule, called Communication rule,
one obtains a cut-free calculus for Gödel logic, see [3] .
Further examples of hypersequent calculi, ranging from modal logics to many-valued logics, can be found, e.g., in [2, 4, 5, 10, 9] .
As usual, we say that a sequent Γ A is valid in a Kripke model K if, for any element α in K, either α − / −B for some B ∈ Γ, or α −−A. This definition can be extended to hypersequents as follows: Given a class of posets F, we say that a hypersequent H is valid in F if for any Kripke model K built on F at least one of its components is valid in K.
Logics of Bounded Width Kripke Models
This section is devoted to investigate the intermediate logics Bw k , with k ≥ 1 (Bw stands for "bounded width"). These logics are characterized by the class F w≤k of posets of width ≤ k, that is, not containing an antichain of cardinality greater than k. A Hilbert style axiomatization of Bw k is as follows
In particular Bw 1 coincides with (infinite-valued) Gödel logic.
For k ≥ 1, the hypersequent calculus hBw k is given by adding to the hypersequent calculus for Int of Table 1 the following rule
Remark 2 The (Bw 1 ) rule coincides with the following simplification, suggested by Mints, of Avron's Communication rule (see [5, p.9] )
We show that hBw k is sound and complete with respect to Bw k .
Theorem 3 (Soundness) If a hypersequent H is derivable in hBw k , then it is valid in F w≤k .
Proof Since all the rules of the hypersequent calculus for Int are valid in F w≤k , it remains to show that so is the (Bw k ) rule. By way of contradiction, let us suppose that the premises of the (Bw k ) rule are valid in F w≤k , but the conclusion is not. Thus there exists a Kripke model K built on F w≤k together with k + 1 elements α 0 , . . . , α k such that
Hence, α 0 , . . . , α k are pairwise incomparable, and this contradicts the hypothesis that K is built on F w≤k .
Proof We rely on the completeness of the axiomatization for Bw k (proved, e.g., in [8] ), and we show that all the axioms are derivable in hBw k . Since the axioms of Int are provable in the hInt calculus, and hBw k contains the cut rule, it suffices to show that the axiom characterizing the intermediate logic Bw k is derivable in the hBw k calculus. As a matter of fact we can write p1 p1
Remark 5 By comparing their hypersequent calculi one can immediately see that Bw k+1 ⊆ Bw k .
By the presence of (IC), to prove the cut-elimination theorem for hBw k , we have to consider the multi-cut rule, that is:
where A n and Γ n stand for A, . . . , A (n times) and Γ, . . . , Γ (n times), respectively. It is easy to see that the cut rule is a particular case of the multi-cut rule. Conversely, each application of the multi-cut rule can be replaced by repeated applications of the cut rule.
Theorem 6 (Cut-elimination) If a hypersequent H is derivable in hBw k then it is derivable in hBw k without using the cut rule.
Proof Cut-elimination for hypersequent calculi works essentially in the same way as for the corresponding sequent calculi.
It is enough to show that if P is a proof in hBw k of a hypersequent H containing only one multi-cut rule which occurs as the last inference of P, then H is derivable in hBw k without the multi-cut rule.
As noticed in [9] , a simple way to make the inductive argument work in the presence of the (EC) rule is to consider the number of applications of this rule in a given derivation as an independent parameter. Let r be the number of the applications of the (EC) rule in the proofs of the premises of the multi-cut rule, c be the complexity of the multi-cut wff, and h be the sum of the length of the proofs of the premises of the multi-cut rule.
The proof will proceed by induction on lexicographically ordered triple (r, c, h). We shall argue by cases according to which inference rule is being applied immediately before the application of the multi-cut rule: We will give here a proof for some relevant cases, omitting the side hypersequents that are not involved in the derivation.
Suppose that the last inference in the proof of one premise of the multi-cut is the (EC) rule, and the proof ends as follows:
Let r be the number of applications of the (EC) rule in the above proof. This proof can be replaced by
which contains two multi-cuts with r − 1 applications of the (EC) rule. Then, all these multi-cuts can be eliminated by induction hypothesis. We show how to eliminate a multi-cut involving the (Bw k ) rule. Suppose, for instance, that the proof P ends as follows:
This proof can be replaced by
in which there are k multi-cuts having the same r and c as P, while the sum of the length of the proofs of the premises is smaller than the one of the multi-cut in P. Then these multi-cuts can be eliminated by induction hypothesis. The cases involving the logical rules, are essentially treated as in the cut-elimination proof of the LJ sequent calculus for Int (see, e.g., [21] ).
For instance, suppose that in both the premises of the multi-cut rule the last inference is the rule for →. Let us also assume that the proof P ends as follows:
in which four multi-cuts occur. In two of them, all numbers r and c are as in P, while the sum of the length of the proofs of the premises is smaller than that of multi-cut in P. In the two remaining multi-cuts, r is the same as in P and the complexity of the multi-cut wff's is strictly smaller than the one of the multi-cut in P. Then all these multi-cuts can be eliminated by induction hypothesis.
Logics of Bounded Cardinality Kripke Models
In this section we define cut-free calculi for logics Bc k , with k ≥ 1 (Bc stands for "bounded cardinality"). These logics are characterized by the class F c≤k of rooted posets of cardinality ≤ k, in symbols, |P | ≤ k. A Hilbert style axiomatization of Bc k is given by
and Bc 2 coincide with Cl and Sm ( [8] ), respectively. The latter, like LQ and Gödel logic, is one of the seven propositional logics satisfying Craig's Interpolation Theorem (see [17] ). In [1] it was defined a cut-free sequent calculus for Sm by translating a suitable duplication-free tableau calculus originating from a semantical framework. However in this calculus the rules for connectives are quite complex and the subformula property does not hold. For k ≥ 1, the hypersequent calculus hBc k is given by adding to the hypersequent calculus for Int the following rule
for every i, j such that 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and i + 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Remark 7
The (Bc 1 ) rule coincides with the (cl) rule introduced in [10] . Therefore hBc 1 is a (single-conclusion) hypersequent calculus for Cl.
We show that hBc k is sound and complete with respect to Bc k .
Theorem 8 (Soundness) If a hypersequent H is derivable in hBc k , then it is valid in F c≤k .
Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 3. By way of contradiction, let us suppose that the premises of the (Bc k ) rule are valid in F c≤k , but the conclusion is not. Thus there exists a Kripke model K built on F c≤k together with k + 1 elements α 0 , . . . , α k such that α h −−Γ h but α h − / −A h for h = 0, . . . , k − 1 and α k −−Γ k . Let the indexes i and j satisfy the conditions 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ k and i ≤ j. Since Γ i , Γ j A i is valid in K, and α j −−Γ j , by the monotonicity property of −− we get that α j ≤ α i and hence α i = α j . Then, α 0 , . . . , α k are distinct elements and K has at least k + 1 elements, a contradiction.
Proof As in the proof of Theorem 4, we only have to prove that the axiom characterizing the intermediate logic Bc k is derivable in the hBc k calculus. To this purpose let us write p0 p0 . . . p0 p0
Theorem 10 (Cut-elimination) If a hypersequent H is derivable in hBc k then it is derivable in hBc k without using the cut rule.
Proof The proof proceeds as in Theorem 6.
Remark 11 By comparing their hypersequent calculi it is not hard to see that, for each k ≥ 1, both Bc k+1 and Bw k are included in Bc k .
14]. In these calculi the many-valued semantics is strongly built into the proof theory. Indeed in any n-valued logic, sequents (or tableaux) are split into n or n − 1 parts, each corresponding, respectively, to a different truth-value of the logic ( [20, 19, 7] ), or to a set of truth-values ( [14] ). The rules for connectives are directly drawn from their truth-tables. Therefore these calculi are far from traditional calculi and, more importantly, their structure makes it impossible to relate the various many-valued systems via their corresponding calculi. In particular these calculi hide all existing relationships between finite-valued Gödel logics and the other logics considered in this paper.
In this section we define cut-free hypersequent calculi for finite-valued Gödel logics. These calculi are obtained by simply adding to the calculus for Int some suitable structural rules.
A first method to define a hypersequent calculus for G k is to add both the rules (Bw 1 ) and (Bc k ) to the hypersequent calculus for Int of Table 1 . From a semantical point of view, the (Bw 1 ) rule forces the states of the model to be linearly ordered, while the (Bc k ) rule establishes that these states can be at most k. Soundness and completeness of this calculus with respect to G k directly follow from the results proved in the previous sections. An alternative cut-free calculus for G k can be defined replacing the (Bw 1 ) and (Bc k ) rules by the following single rule which semantically combine the meaning of (Bw 1 ) and (Bc k )
For k ≥ 1, let hG k be the hypersequent calculus obtained by adding to hInt the (G k ) rule.
Remark 12 hG 1 and hG 2 are respectively a (single-conclusion) hypersequent calculus for Cl and a hypersequent calculus for Sm logic. Notice that hG 1 coincides with hBc 1 , while hG 2 is simpler than hBc 2 .
We show that hG k is sound and complete with respect to (k + 1)-valued Gödel logic.
Theorem 13 (Soundness) If a hypersequent H is derivable in hG k , then it is valid in F k-lo .
Proof The proof proceeds as in Theorem 3. By way of contradiction, let us suppose that the premises of the (G k ) rule are valid in F k-lo , but the conclusion is not. Then there exists a Kripke model K built on F k-lo together with elements α 0 , . . . , α k such that α i −−Γ i but α i − / −A i for i = 0, . . . , k − 1 and α k −−Γ k . Let 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. Since α i+1 −−Γ i+1 and Γ i , Γ i+1 A i is valid, we must have α i+1 ≤ α i . Being K linearly ordered, we must have α 0 < α 1 < . . . < α k . Therefore K is built on a linearly ordered poset with at least k + 1 distinct elements, which is impossible.
Theorem 14 (Completeness)
If a wff A ∈ L(F k-lo ) then A is derivable in hG k .
Proof It suffices to observe that both the (Bw 1 ) and the (Bc k ) rules are derivable in hG k . This is trivial for the latter rule since its premises are strictly included in the premises of the (G k ) rule. Let k be an odd number. To derive the (Bw 1 ) rule in the hG k calculus let us write
The derivation of the (Bw 1 ) rule for k being even is similar. Therefore the claim follows by Theorems 4 and 9.
Theorem 15 (Cut-elimination) If a hypersequent H is derivable in hG k then it is derivable in hG k without using the cut rule.
Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.
Remark 16 By comparing their hypersequent calculi one can immediately see that G k+1 ⊆ G k . Moreover it follows that for each n ≥ k, both Bw n and Bc n are included in (k + 1)-valued Gödel logic.
